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1. Abstract
The yearly aggregated tax income data of all, more than 8000, Italian municipalities
are analyzed for a period of five years, from 2007 to 2011, to search for conformity or
not with Benford’s law, a counter-intuitive phenomenon observed in large tabulated
data where the occurrence of numbers having smaller initial digits is more favored
than those with larger digits. This is done in anticipation that large deviations from
Benford’s law will be found in view of tax evasion supposedly being widespread
across Italy. Contrary to expectations, we show that the overall tax income data for
all these years is in excellent agreement with Benford’s law. Furthermore, we also
analyze the data of Calabria, Campania and Sicily, the three Italian regions known
for strong presence of mafia, to see if there are any marked deviations from Benford’s
law. Again, we find that all yearly data sets for Calabria and Sicily agree with
Benford’s law whereas only the 2007 and 2008 yearly data show departures from
the law for Campania. These results are again surprising in view of underground
and illegal nature of economic activities of mafia which significantly contribute to
tax evasion. Some hypothesis for the found conformity is presented.
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3. Introduction
In the present information age the collection, processing and dissemination of data
from different financial activities, of utmost importance for human welfare, is quite
easy and convenient. However, for policy makers, the extraction of meaningful in-
formation, critical for plausible strategic decisions, from the sea of available data is
a formidable challenge. The far reaching, adverse, consequences of using flawed data
have been exemplified by the 2007 financial crisis in the initiation of which data of
questionable quality being used in corporates and governments played a significant
role [1].
One statistical tool which can serve as a first check on the quality of (large)
numerical data and thereby, to a great extent, simplifies the deciphering of anomalies
present in (large) data sets is the so-called Benford’s law [2, 3]. The law describes
the counter-intuitive uneven distribution of numbers in large data sets. Usually, it
appears that the occurrence of the first digits of numbers has nothing to do with
their abundance within the data. In fact, in a large data set, the appearance of
each digit from 1 to 9 as first digit is equally likely with a proportion of about
11%. However, according to Benford’s law, the appearance of digits is such that the
distribution of the first digits tends to be logarithmic with numbers having smaller
first digits appearing more frequently than those having larger first digits. Thus, the
distribution is heavily skewed in favor of smaller digits with digits 1, 2 and 3 taking
about 60% of the total occurrences as first digits and the remaining six digits i.e. 4
to 9 left with only 40% of the occurrences.
Benford’s law was first reported by Newcomb [2] following his observation that
the pages of logarithmic table books get progressively cleaner as one moves from
initial to latter pages, the first page being the dirtiest. About four decades latter,
Benford rediscovered the phenomenon through a similar observation and established
it on a more solid footing by testing its accuracy on a large volume of data he
collected from diverse fields, e.g. physical constants, atomic and molecular masses,
street addresses, length of rivers etc. and concluded that the occurrence of first
significant digits follow a logarithmic distribution [3]
P (d) = log10(1 +
1
d
), d = 1, 2, 3..., 9 (1)
where P(d) is the probability of a number having the first non-zero digit d and
log10 is logarithmic to base 10.
The theoretical proportions for each of the digits from 1 to 9 to be first significant
digit are as shown in Table 1.
The development of research on Benford’s law into a full fledged field is as
fascinating as the discovery of the law itself. Firstly, though the mathematical
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Table 1: The distribution of first significant digits as predicted by Benford’s law
Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Proportion 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
form of the law is very simple a complete mathematical understanding is yet to
be achieved [4–7]. Furthermore, the law represents the only distribution of leading
digits invariant under scale and base transformations [8–11]. Secondly, numerous
data sets from diverse fields conform to the law [12–26]. For an exhaustive list refer
to [27]. Yet, there is a priori no set of criteria to predict what type of data should
conform to the law. Necessary and sufficient conditions are much in debate. Nev-
ertheless, (i) the presence of sufficient number of entries in the data, for digits to
manifest themselves, (ii) spanning of several orders of magnitude, and (iii) the ab-
sence of any human restrictions, i.e. there are no built in minima or maxima, on the
appearance of numbers in data are some properties that data under investigation
must posses for conformity to the law [28].
4. Relevant literature
After the seminal work of Benford, the first digit phenomenon again came to promi-
nence following the efforts of Nigrini who reported its frequent emergence in financial
data [29–31]. Furthermore, Nigrini provided the first practical application of Ben-
ford’s law in the detection of tax evasion by hypothesizing that to save on their
tax liabilities individuals might understate income items and overstate deduction
items in their tax return files leading to overall distortion of digital frequencies. A
Benford’s law test successfully captured the manipulation of digital frequencies in
the submitted data [29]. Furthermore, falsification of financial documents, manip-
ulated trade invoices and tax returns submitted by companies have been clearly
unraveled [30]. Today the law is routinely used by forensic analysts to detect error,
incompleteness and wilfull manipulation of the financial data. The basic premise
of the test is that first digits in real data, in general, have a tendency to approach
the Benford distribution whereas people intending to play with the numbers, when
unaware of the law, try to place the digits uniformly. Thus any departure from the
law raises suspicion about the quality of the data [32] and/or in the process involved
in its generation [33].
Benford’s law has been successfully utilized to expose the intention of cheating
in both corporates and the governments. In order to attract investment, firms must
posses a strong financial basis. Moreover, to project a healthy, though sometimes
superficial, picture they report enhanced profits and reduced losses which are not
always the actual values. Such a manipulation of financial statements, known as
cosmetic earning management, is achieved through the rounding of numbers. This
was detected first for firms in New Zealand where the frequency of zeros and nines
as second digit of reported earnings was respectively more and less than could be
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expected from Benford’s law [34]. Subsequently this unethical phenomenon has been
reported to be the practice of the day for the firms worldwide [35]. A recent example
of corporate data manipulation, on a truly global scale, is the 2011 LIBOR scandal
in which a cartel of banks distorted the interest pricing process of the inter-bank
loans [36]. Countries, like firms, also falsify economic data when it is strategically
advantageous [37]. Thus, questions have been raised about the data submitted by
Greece to the Eurostat to meet the strict deficit criteria set by the European Union
(EU). Among all the member states of EU, the data submitted by Greece has
been found to have the greatest deviation from Benford’s law [38]. Similarly, the
macroeconomic data of China is a subject of much debate, as it has been alleged to
be overstating its GDP numbers to mislead investors [39]. Furthermore, a Benford’s
law based assessment of the macroeconomic data submitted by countries to the
World Bank hints at deliberate falsification of the data from the developing countries
[40].
The manipulative behavior percolates down to the local governments as recent
studies using Benford’s law have uncovered deficiencies in the data of municipal-
ities and states of several countries. The cases in point are the Valejo City, Or-
ange County and Jefferson County in U.S., whose local authorities have filed for
bankruptcy. The digit distributions of the financial statements of all the three mu-
nicipalities have been shown to have significant departures from that expected on
the basis of Benford’s law, thereby raising questions about the credibility of the
statements on revenues and spending [41]. Further indications of data tampering by
local governments have been uncovered through a Benford analysis of the official
financial reports of the fifty states of U.S. [42]. Another study from Brazil analyzing
the digit distribution of 134,281 contracts issued by 20 management units in two
states found significant deviations from Benford’s law and concluded that there is a
tendency to avoid conducting the bidding process and the rounding in determining
the value of contracts [43].
In Italy, the municipalities represent the lowest level of the government responsi-
ble for providing services to the local residents. Some of these activities are property
issues, such as building permits, street lump, garbage collection, public transport,
etc., and social activities, such as child and elderly care services, etc. [44]. Tax collec-
tion is a fundamental source of revenues for local governments enabling the efficient
delivery of services [45]. On the other hand, tax evasion is known to be widespread
across Italy with studies estimating between quarter and half of the country’s GDP
to be hidden from authorities in the form of underground economy [46]. The eva-
sion of taxes is detrimental to the financial health of municipalities. To contain any
financial distress, the municipalities resort to scaling down of expenditure like cut-
ting on the number of employees, reducing the salaries of those that continue to be
employed and even complete stopping of some of the services [47]. Thus, any finan-
cial distress of municipalities has severe repercussions on the lives of the taxpayers
and municipal employees. It is important to have better oversight of the quality of
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financial statements and accountability over the use of funds. The concerns on data
quality and the poor auditing procedures being used have resurfaced more vigor-
ously following the bankruptcy of number of local government bodies across several
industrialized countries during recent financial crisis.
In the present study, we analyze the yearly aggregated tax data of all the Italian
municipalities (cities) for a period of five years from 2007 to 2011 to see if there
are any deviations from Benford’s law. Beforehand, given the scale of tax evasion
in Italy, one expects that the digit distribution of tax data would be in complete
disagreement of the predictions of Benford’s law. However, we find that the tax data
of all the Italian cities shows an impressive compliance to the law.
Furthermore, we also analyze the yearly (city cumulated) data from three Italian
regions of Calabria, Campania and Sicily. The municipalities of these regions have,
from common knowledge or assumption, a low level of governance, poor delivery
of services, and substantial presence of mafia and organized crime [48, 49]. Thus
given the poor tax administration in the municipalities of these regions, we again
anticipated to find some hints of tax evasion through deviations from Benford’s law.
Surprisingly, the data from these three regions also satisfy the law, except the years
2007 and 2008 data for Campania which show large deviations from Benford’s law.
5. Data analysis and Results
5.1. Data
The Italian state is organized in four levels of government (i) a central government
(ii) 20 regional governments (iii) 110 provincial governments and (iv) more than 8000
municipalities, at the time of this writing. The municipalities represent the lowest
level of the government in the administrative structure of Italy. Each municipality
belongs to one and only one province, and each province is contained in one and
only one region. The total number of municipalities has slightly varied over the
years. This is due to occasional administrative reorganization, through the acts of
the Italian Parliament, leading to the creation of new municipalities and sometimes
also the merger of two or more municipalities into one [50]. Thus we have a total
of 8101, 8094, 8094, 8092 and 8092 municipalities respectively for year 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. During this time interval, 7 municipalities have
changed from a province to another one, - in so doing also changing from a region
(Marche) to another (Emilia-Romagna), in 2008.
We have analyzed the yearly aggregated tax income (ATI) data of all munici-
palities for the period of five years from 2007 to 2011. The data has been obtained
by (and from) the Research Center of the Italian Ministry of Finance and Economy
(MFE). We have disaggregated contributions at the municipal level to the Italian
GDP.
The standard methodology of a Benford analysis is to first count the appear-
ances of each digit from 1 to 9 as the first digit of numbers in the data. Then the
corresponding theoretical frequency of each digit as first digit is determined from
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Benford’s law. This is followed by estimating the goodness of fit of the theoretical
and observed digit distributions both graphically and also using suitable fitness test.
These steps are explained through the analysis of the yearly tax data for all the Ital-
ian cities in Table 2. The NObs, the number of times each digit from 1 to 9 appears
as the first significant digit in the corresponding data are shown for each yearly
data set in columns 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 of Table 2. Also shown are NBen, the corresponding
counts (in brackets) for each digit as predicted by Benford’s law:
NBen = Nlog10(1 +
1
d
) (2)
where N for each year is the total number of records i.e. the number of municipali-
ties. For example, the total number of municipalities for year 2007 is N = 8101, as
shown in column 2 of Table 2. The root mean square error (∆N) is calculated from
the binomial distribution [16]
∆N =
√
NP (d)(1 − P (d)) (3)
The observed count for digit 1 as first significant digit is 2433 for 2007, whereas
the expected count from Benford’s law is 2438.64 with an error of about 41.29. The
expected count from Benford’s law and the corresponding error depends only on
the number of records in the sample of data. For the yearly ATI data the number of
records for years 2008 and 2009 is 8094 and is 8092 for years 2010 and 2011. Thus,
the expected count from Benford’s law and the corresponding errors are shown only
once in Column 4 and 6 respectively for such cases. From a visual inspection of Table
2, it is found that the observed and expected digit distributions are in reasonable
agreement within the margins of the calculated error. This is further illustrated in
Fig. 1, where the observed proportion of the first digits are compared with those
expected from Benford’s law. Contrary to the a priori expectations, for the ATI data
of all these years, the agreement between the observed and theoretically predicted
distributions is quite remarkable.
In view of the statistical quantification of the closeness between the observed
and predicted digits distributions, the Pearson’s χ2, the most widely used test in
Benford’s law literature,
χ2(n− 1) =
n∑
i=1
(NObs −NBen)
2
NBen
(4)
is thereafter used. Of course, zero is not the significant digit when it occupies the
extreme left of a number. Thus, in case of the first digit analysis, we have n = 9
”data points”, whence n− 1 = 8 degrees of freedom. The critical value of χ2, under
95% confidence level, for acceptance or rejection of null hypothesis - the observed
and theoretically predicted digit distribution are same, is χ2(8)=15.507. If the value
of the calculated χ2 is less than the critical value, then we accept the null hypothesis
and conclude that the data fits Benford’s law.
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5.2. Results
For the 2007 ATI data (column 2 of Table 2), the χ2 is 15.36 (the last row and column
2 of Table 2), a value smaller than χ2(8) = 15.507; whence the null hypothesis is
accepted indicating in turn that the tax data for year 2007 follows Benford’s law.
The calculated χ2 for the year 2008 is 27.52 and for 2009 is 18.96 which are far
greater than the critical value of 15.507. Therefore, the null hypothesis must be
rejected. Furthermore, the χ2 for year 2010 is 12.29 and for 2011 is 13.72 and
both values are less than the critical value, such that the null hypothesis must be
accepted.
From a visual examination of Fig. 1, showing the comparison of the observed
proportion of the first digits with those expected from Benford’s law, the conclusion
is of an excellent compliance for all the years. Thus for the 2008 and 2009 ATI
data, conclusions on compliance to Benford’s law drawn from Fig.1 and the χ2 test
appear to be contradictory. However, it is known that the results of the χ2 test
are sensitive to the number of records in the data under analysis. The rejection of
the null hypothesis becomes difficult for samples of small sizes, called type II error,
whereas for large samples the test suffers from ”excessive power”, wherein even a
small deviation from Benford’s law turns out to be significant, called type I error.
This leads to a wrongful rejection of the null hypothesis. The large data sets require
increasingly better fits to pass the χ2 threshold for conformity [31], although by
inspection they give better fits than small data sets, and often fail a χ2 test that
the small dataset passes. Thus, larger values of χ2 for the tax data of years 2008
and 2009, in our study, are likely due to this excessive power, despite the fact that
they visually appear to show clear and extraordinary conformity to Benford’s law.
In fact, it is due to this excessive power that the calculated χ2 for 2007, 2010 and
2011 yearly data sets are only marginally smaller than the critical value of 15.507,
though the close visual conformity, evident from Fig. 1, compels one to expect much
smaller values. Thus, rather than being an indication of departure of the ATI data
from Benford’s law, the high χ2 values are a manifestation of the limitations of the
Pearson’s χ2 test itself.
A second analysis is in order. It is widely accepted that the so-called underground
or black economy is larger in the Southern regions of Italy than elsewhere. Studies
have shown that personal income tax and value added tax evasion is highest in
Calabria, Sicily and Campania [48]. In anticipation to find some support for this
conjecture through the deviations from Benford’s law, we specifically analyzed the
data from these three regions.
Calabria consists of 409 municipalities grouped in 5 provinces. We show the
analysis for the tax data of all years for Calabria in Table 3. Again since the number
of records is same for all the yearly data sets the Benford expected frequency of each
digit and the corresponding error are same and are only shown once in Column 6 of
the Table 3. The Pearson’s χ2 are all much smaller than the critical value of 15.507.
Therefore, we conclude that the ATI data follows Benford’s law, a fact which is also
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clearly attested by Fig. 2, where the observed and expected digit distributions are
compared.
The analysis for Sicily region is shown in Table 4. Again both the calculated χ2
and the corresponding graphical representation of Fig. 3 show an excellent compli-
ance to the law.
The results for the Campania region are shown in Table 5. Here, the respective χ2
for 2007 and 2008 are large than the critical value for acceptance of null hypothesis.
Thus, for these two years the ATI data of Campania region clearly deviates from
Benford’s law. The χ2 for years 2009 to 2011 are less than the critical value of
15.507, though only marginally. It may be noted here that unlike the case of 2008
and 2009 yearly data for all the municipalities, for which the results of the χ2 test
are contradictory to the inferences, evident from the corresponding figure Fig. 1,
for Campania, the calculated χ2 and the observations from the corresponding figure
Fig. 4 are complimentary. The departure of Campania data from Benford’s law can
be clearly seen from Fig. 4 where the frequency of digit 3 is much less and that of
digit 6 is much greater than expected from Benford’s law.
October 14, 2014 0:44 arxiv
9
Table 2: The Observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of Aggregated
Income Tax data of all Italian cities. In brackets, the expected count from Benford’s
law and the corresponding errors for the data on the column on the left.
First Digit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 2433 (2438.64 ±41.29) 2421 2433 (2436.54 ±41.27) 2454 2471 (2435.93 ±41.26)
2 1436 (1426.51 ±34.28) 1466 1472 (1425.27 ±34.27) 1459 1454 (1424.92 ±34.26)
3 951 (1012.14 ±29.76) 932 918 (1011.26 ±29.75) 931 931 (1011.01 ±29.74)
4 755 (785.07 ±26.63) 756 758 (784.39 ±26.62) 751 752 (784.20 ±26.61)
5 635 (641.44 ±24.3) 620 637 (640.88 ±24.29) 645 628 (640.72 ±24.29)
6 575 (542.36 ±22.5) 578 557 (541.89 ±22.49) 559 572 (541.76 ±22.48)
7 478 (469.78 ±21.04) 501 510 (469.37 ±21.03) 499 505 (469.26 ±21.02)
8 412 (414.37 ±19.83) 384 402 (414.01 ±19.82) 405 404 (413.91 ±19.82)
9 426 (370.7 ±18.81) 436 407 (370.38 ±18.8) 389 380 (370.29 ±18.8)
# records 8101 8094 8094 8092 8092
χ
2
15.36 27.52 18.96 12.29 13.72
Table 3: The Observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data
of 409 municipalities of Calabria. In brackets, the expected count from Benford’s
law and the corresponding errors.
First Digit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 122 123 122 126 123 (123.12 ±9.28)
2 62 67 67 68 68 (72.02 ±7.7)
3 54 52 49 47 48 (51.1 ±6.69)
4 40 38 41 42 39 (39.64 ±5.98)
5 30 30 26 25 30 (32.38 ±5.46)
6 30 28 31 33 35 (27.38 ±5.05)
7 28 30 29 30 26 (23.72 ±4.73)
8 19 17 20 21 22 (20.92 ±4.46)
9 24 24 24 17 18 (18.72 ±4.23)
χ
2
4.44 4.51 4.94 5.42 3.02
6. Discussion
Though tax evasion in Italy is a phenomenon of gigantic proportions [46] its estima-
tion is easier said than done [51]. Nevertheless, the literature on estimation of tax
evasion in Italy is plentiful. The levels of tax evasion have been shown to vary across
different regions of Italy [48, 52] and also across different sections of the Italian so-
ciety along its economic landscape [53,54]. Furthermore, political and social factors
responsible for the thriving of tax evasion have been pointed out. For example, the
lack of governance [48] and the levying of higher taxes are known to discourage
taxpayers [44]. The congestion of tax evaders is another factor encouraging evasion
October 14, 2014 0:44 arxiv
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Table 4: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data of
390 municipalities of Sicily. In brackets, the expected count from Benford’s law and
the corresponding errors.
First Digit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 112 106 109 110 113 (117.4 ±9.06)
2 76 80 79 77 76 (68.68 ±7.52)
3 48 48 48 51 49 (48.73 ±6.53)
4 30 30 30 29 31 (37.79 ±5.84)
5 33 32 31 33 30 (30.88 ±5.33)
6 31 27 28 22 26 (26.11 ±4.94)
7 20 26 25 31 27 (22.62 ±4.62)
8 19 17 20 15 15 (19.95 ±4.35)
9 21 24 20 22 23 (17.85 ±4.13)
χ
2
4.61 7.73 4.42 9.72 5.76
Table 5: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data
of 551 municipalities of Campania. In brackets, the expected count from Benford’s
law and the corresponding errors.
First Digit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 170 173 171 171 171 (165.87 ±10.77)
2 88 88 97 95 95 (97.03 ±8.94)
3 53 51 50 50 48 (68.84 ±7.76)
4 52 55 50 48 46 (53.4 ±6.94)
5 37 36 39 45 48 (43.63 ±6.34)
6 56 55 51 48 43 (36.89 ±5.87)
7 28 24 28 27 33 (31.95 ±5.49)
8 30 34 33 36 32 (28.18 ±5.17)
9 37 35 32 31 35 (25.21 ±4.91)
χ
2
21.65 23.02 14.56 13.56 13.34
as tax authorities are overburdened thereby reducing the risk of detection [55].
The modeling of tax evasion is difficult as evasion in itself consists of partial
or complete concealment of a significant proportion of economic activities from
the authorities. Thus researchers rely on sample surveys believing that people will
disclose their true incomes when promised anonymity [54]. The data from surveys
are then compared with the official data maintained by Italian MFE. The latter
is in fact the primary source of data invariably employed in modeling the different
aspects of tax evasion. However, there is some general concern and much skepticism
on the quality of tax data being maintained by MFE. The existence of several
inconsistencies related to format, syntax and semantic have been pointed out. More
serious, from the point of view of the subject in this present study, are the missing,
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Fig. 1: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data of
all Italian cities.
obsolete, or incorrect data values and undiscussed outliers [56].
The present study assesses the quality of the MFE tax data relating to mu-
nicipalities through the application of Benford’s law in order to see whether there
are in the ATI set, numerical anomalies which might hint at deliberate attempts of
manipulation. Any manipulation, if found, would in turn likely signal the intention
of tax evasion. When people resort to under-reporting their taxable incomes, the
occurrence pattern of digits in the tax return files will be altered in a major way.
This has been shown to be true by Nigrini, in the first ever practical application of
Benford’s law, after analyzing tax return files of individuals on U.S. Internal Rev-
enue Services. It was revealed that tax payers with low incomes resorted to blatant
manipulation of line items at filing time to a greater extent than high income tax
payers [29]. Furthermore, prior studies suggest that Benford’s law successfully cap-
tures the manipulation of tax data to the point that the deviations from the law
are acceptable as evidence in courts of several USA states.
Our present study shows that overall tax data of Italian municipalities are in
complete agreement with Benford’s law, thereby negating the presence of evasion.
At first, these results are somewhat surprising, since large scale presence of tax
October 14, 2014 0:44 arxiv
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Fig. 2: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data of
Calabria.
evasion in Italy is well documented. However, on a more close scrutiny the reason
for the compliance of data in our study becomes apparent. In our analysis, each
municipality reports only one record of tax data for a particular year (in contrast to
Nigrini analysis of the data records of individual tax payers). Since municipalities
are composed of hundreds and thousands of inhabitants the tax value is an aggregate
value which, of course, is a result of combinations of tax receipts of a large number of
citizens. Thus, any individual deviation from Benford’s law might be lost due to the
multiple mathematical operations. In fact, the numbers obtained after multiplying a
lot of numbers together have been found to agree with Benford’s law. This has been
conjectured to be one of the possible mathematical explanations for the validity of
the law [11, 57, 58].
It is relevant to mention here that another type of evasion comprises of com-
plete concealment of incomes from the authorities. Such incomes usually arise from
underground illegal activities like thefts, drugs, kickbacks, skimming and contract
rigging. Since no record/trace of transactions exists at all the detection of tax evasion
through such ”underground” economic activities cannot be achieved with Benford’s
law.
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Fig. 3: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data of
Sicily.
Previous studies have shown that personal income tax and value added tax eva-
sion is highest in Calabria, Sicily and Campania i.e. the Southern regions of Italy.
The relative backwardness of these regions may be one reason for the high tax
evasion since inefficiency of the municipalities in delivering services discourages the
payment of taxes as tax payers do not see any proper return for their paid taxes. The
weak governments of poorer regions are generally less efficient in tax administra-
tion [48] further affecting the realization of tax revenues due to the strong presence
of black economy, arising out of illegal and underground activities of mafia, (always)
hidden from the authorities. Furthermore, extortion by mafia compels legal busi-
nesses to evade taxes. Fearful of their extensive reach and the deadly consequences
for not obeying them businesses pay taxes to mafia rather than to government [59].
Furthermore, the mafia infiltration of local governments of municipalities across
these regions are pervasive and in order to restore the law enforcement against such
infiltration the central government from time to time has resorted to the dissolution
of the municipal administration. Over the years there have been a total 217 disso-
lution of local municipalities across Italy. However, most of the dissolutions have
been invoked in the municipalities of South-Italian regions with only 4 dissolutions
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Fig. 4: The observed and Benford expected first digit distributions of ATI data of
Campania.
being reported outside these regions [60]. In the light of the above discussion, there
are sufficient reasons to suspect that the tax data of these regions would show large
departures from Benford’s law. On the contrary, we found that income tax data
from these regions shows strong submission to Benford’s law except for the 2007
and 2008 yearly data of Campania. This is somewhat surprising since the Calabrian
’Ndrangheta’ is the most powerful amongst all the Italian mafias [61].
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed the yearly aggregated tax income data of all the Italian mu-
nicipalities to search whether there are anomalies which might hint at deliberate
attempts of manipulation for tax evasion, a phenomenon widespread across the
country, according to common knowledge. However, the overall data showed excel-
lent compliance with Benford’s law, thereby negating the presence of manipulations
at this aggregate level. It might be that the aggregation process hides some indi-
vidual breakdowns. However, the aggregation is not a multiplicative process.
We have also analyzed the municipality tax data of three regions (Calabria,
Campania and Sicily) known for the strong presence of mafia. Again the data showed
October 14, 2014 0:44 arxiv
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compliance to Benford’s law except for the 2007 and 2008 data for Campania which
showed significant departures from the law. Our findings suggests to reconsider the
Campania data.
No need to say that the other (17) regions might be similarly investigated. More-
over, one possibility for further probing the data and maybe concluding on some
reason for the breakdown of Benford’s law, in a few cases, would be to investigate
the province level. The reader will easily understand that this demands 110 or so
tests/year. This activity goes beyond the scope of the present report and is left open
for further research.
Up to now, necessary and sufficient conditions for the application, and the more
so, explanation of Benford’s law are not known, in spite of intense applications. The
present report indicates that more theoretical and numerical investigations are still
of interest.
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